Are International Accounting Standards more Credit Relevant than Domestic Standards? by Florou, Annita et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Florou, A., Kosi, U., & Pope, P. (2016). Are International Accounting Standards more Credit Relevant than
Domestic Standards? ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
  
 
Are International Accounting Standards more Credit Relevant than Domestic 
Standards? 
 
 
Annita Florou 
King’s College London 
Department of Management 
Franklin-Wilkins Building 
150 Stamford Street  
London SE1 8WA  
Tel: +44(0)20 7848 4169 
Email: annita.florou@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Urska Kosi

 
Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Institute of Accounting and Auditing  
Welthandelsplatz 1 
1020 Vienna 
Austria 
Tel: +43(0)1 31336 5691 
Email: urska.kosi@wu.ac.at 
 
Peter F. Pope 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Department of Accounting 
25 Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: +44(0)20 7849 4925 
Email: p.pope@lse.ac.uk 
 
July 2016 
 
 
 
                                                 

 Corresponding author. We appreciate comments from Sreedhar Bharath, Darren Henderson, Mark 
Schaffer, Steve Stillman, Marco Trombetta, Florin Vasvari and participants at research workshops at 
WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, ESSEC and Humboldt University Berlin, the AAA 2010 
Annual Meeting, the VIII Workshop on Empirical Research in Financial Accounting, the 33
rd
 EAA 
Annual Congress and the 2012 International Accounting Section Midyear Meeting. This work was 
supported by the EC-funded INTACCT programme - The European IFRS Revolution: Compliance, 
Consequences and Policy Lessons under Grant Contract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035850.  
  
Are International Accounting Standards more Credit Relevant than Domestic 
Standards? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine whether the credit relevance of financial statements, defined as the ability of 
accounting numbers to explain credit ratings, is higher after firms are required to report under 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). We find an improvement in credit relevance 
for firms in seventeen countries after mandatory IFRS reporting is introduced in 2005; this 
increase is higher than that reported for a matched sample of US firms. The increase in credit 
relevance is particularly pronounced for higher risk speculative-grade issuers, where accounting 
information is predicted to be more important; and for IFRS adopters with large first-time 
reconciliations, where the impact of IFRS is expected to be greater. These tests provide 
reassurance that the overall enhancement in estimated credit relevance is driven by accounting 
changes related to IFRS adoption. Our results suggest that credit rating analysts’ views of 
economic fundamentals are more closely aligned with IFRS numbers, and that analysts anticipate 
at least some of the effects of the IFRS transition.  
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1. Introduction 
Debt markets are a more important source of new capital for companies than equity markets 
(Henderson et al. 2006); and accounting standard setters recognize that creditors are an important 
financial statement user group (e.g. International Accounting Standards Board 2015).
1
 Yet 
comparatively little is known about how well financial statements address creditors’ needs, 
especially in the international context. Research confirms that US GAAP information is 
important in the credit rating process (Blume et al. 1998, Hann et al. 2007) and in bond pricing 
(Easton et al. 2009). But recent requirements for firms in many countries to report under IFRS 
have not been evaluated from a credit market perspective, with most studies on the relevance of 
IFRS accounting numbers focusing on the equity market perspective (e.g. Barth et al. 2008, 
Barth et al. 2012). Since creditors’ decisions and information needs differ from those of equity 
investors (Holthausen and Watts 2001, Hann et al. 2007), evidence that IFRS is relevant to 
equity markets does not imply relevance for creditors. 
In this paper we compare the credit relevance of financial statement numbers prepared 
under IFRS and under domestic accounting standards for a sample of firms that are required to 
switch to IFRS reporting in 2005. We follow Hann et al. (2007) in defining credit relevance as 
the ability of accounting numbers to explain credit analysts’ ratings. We show that IFRS 
financial statements capture information used by rating analysts better than financial statements 
prepared under domestic standards. Our results also suggest that credit rating analysts understand 
                                                 
1
 For example, during the 2000-2011 period, the average European country’s corporate debt market was three times 
the size of its equity market; the balance between private sector debt and equity in other non-EU countries over the 
same period was comparable. In particular, over 2000-2011 the total amount of debt in the EU was 193 percent (as a 
percentage of GDP), whereas the total value of all shares listed on European stock markets was 59 percent. 
Similarly, the total amount of US corporate debt over the same period was 323 percent as opposed to the total 
market capitalization of stocks which was 126 percent (for further details see World Bank, Global Financial 
Development Database). 
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the limitations of domestic accounting standards and anticipate some of the changes resulting 
from IFRS adoption. 
Because general purpose financial reporting standards can require standard setters to 
trade-off the interests of different user groups, there is a degree of ambiguity concerning the 
relevance of IFRS to creditors. On the one hand, some IFRS requirements are expected to 
enhance the information available to creditors, e.g. the recognition of previously unrecognized 
pension deficits under IAS 19 provides more information on effective debt obligations; and 
impairment accounting under IAS 36 leads to more timely loss recognition (Ball et al. 2008). On 
the other hand, IFRS requires or permits fair valuation of many assets and liabilities and this 
might be inconsistent with creditors’ needs if it results in the recognition of economic gains 
before realization occurs or to the understatement of the carrying value of debt relative to 
contractual obligations. While such accounting treatments are argued by some to be consistent 
with equity investors’ needs, they undermine the usefulness of financial statements to creditors 
(Schipper 2005, Ball et al. 2008). Additionally, IFRS often requires preparers to exercise a high 
degree of judgment and estimation, producing less verifiable and less reliable accounting 
numbers and creating opportunities for opportunistic manipulation of financial statements (Ball 
et al. 2015); for example, firms that choose the fair value measurement basis for their non-
financial assets under IAS 16 provide potentially less reliable asset values and therefore less 
credit relevant information. In light of such doubts about whether IFRS enhances the usefulness 
of financial statements for creditors, the question of how the credit relevance of financial 
statements changes in the switch from domestic accounting standards to IFRS is essentially an 
empirical issue.  
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Our analysis is based on an international sample of firms from seventeen countries which 
mandated IFRS for the first time in 2005 and for which long-term issuer credit ratings are 
available from Standard & Poor’s (S&P). In line with prior studies we use credit ratings as a 
surrogate for estimated default risk and employ a model that includes only accounting variables, 
because our interest is in assessing the ability of accounting fundamentals to capture attributes 
considered relevant by rating analysts (Blume et al. 1998, Hann et al. 2007, Jorion et al. 2009). 
As in Hann et al. (2007) we estimate credit relevance using the explanatory power (the pseudo-
R
2
) of an accounting-based credit rating model estimated by ordered probit.  
In baseline tests we find that the explanatory power of the credit rating model increases 
by a modest 2.5 percentage points in the post-IFRS adoption period. We also document that the 
accuracy of probabilistic forecasts of credit ratings for mandatory IFRS adopters improves after 
the adoption. Next, in line with Barth et al. (2012), we perform comparative analysis using a 
sample of a contemporaneously matched US firms reporting under US GAAP and show that the 
increase in credit relevance for IFRS adopting firms is higher than the improvement in credit 
relevance for their US peers. Inferences remain qualitatively unchanged when we compare IFRS 
adopters to the full population of US firms with S&P credit ratings. Results remain robust to 
further analysis, including alternative samples, rating model specifications and credit relevance 
metrics. We interpret our findings as showing that relative to domestic standards, IFRS financial 
statement numbers map more closely onto latent attributes assessed by credit analysts.  
 To improve confidence that our baseline results are capturing effects related to the 
accounting standards regime change, we conduct two further sets of analysis. First, based on 
prior research findings that accounting numbers are more relevant to creditors when the 
likelihood of borrower default is higher (e.g. De Franco et al. 2009), we predict that IFRS-related 
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changes in credit relevance will be higher when firms have higher default risk. Results support 
this prediction – the increase in credit relevance associated with IFRS adoption is twice as high 
for speculative-grade firms compared to investment-grade firms.  
 Second, we predict that IFRS-related changes in credit relevance should be greatest when 
the switch from domestic standards to IFRS results in relatively large changes to the credit 
ratings model inputs. Similar to Horton et al. (2013) we exploit the requirement under IFRS 1 for 
first-time IFRS adopters to restate and reconcile to IFRS the financial statements prepared under 
domestic accounting standards in the previous year. Based on line item reconciliations between 
domestic standards and IFRS we develop firm-level measures of the distance between local 
GAAP and IFRS. Results show that when first-time IFRS reconciliations are small (i.e. when 
domestic GAAP accounting numbers are relatively close to IFRS numbers) credit relevance in 
the pre-IFRS period is considerably higher than when reconciliations are large; this finding 
suggests that financial statements prepared under domestic standards can be relatively successful 
in capturing the fundamentals of concern to credit rating analysts when firm-level accounting 
numbers are close to IFRS. We also find that credit relevance increases between the pre-IFRS 
and the post-IFRS periods only for firms with large first-time IFRS reconciliation differences, 
i.e. where the expected impact of IFRS adoption is greatest. Finally, when we focus on the IFRS 
transition year alone, credit ratings are better explained by IFRS-restated accounting numbers 
than by domestic standard accounting numbers only for issuers where the differences between 
domestic standards and IFRS are large; this result suggests that credit analysts are able to 
estimate at least some of the accounting differences associated with IFRS transition and that 
these differences are considered relevant in credit rating decisions. The analysis based on first-
time reconciliations of firms is informative because it demonstrates that changes in credit 
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relevance are associated with de facto accounting changes, assessed from the perspective of the 
credit analyst.   
Broadly, our study contributes to the growing literature on the consequences of IFRS 
financial reporting for debt markets by considering changes in the credit relevance of accounting 
information linked to mandatory IFRS adoption.
2
 Our paper is most closely related to the study 
of Wu and Zhang (2014) who examine changes in the sensitivity of credit ratings to accounting 
numbers for IFRS adopters; they find that credit ratings are more sensitive to an accounting 
default factor after mandatory IFRS adoption, but only in countries with strong rule of law. Bhat 
et al. (2014) conduct a similar analysis relating the sensitivity of credit default swap rates to 
earnings, book value and leverage; contrary to Wu and Zhang (2014) they find no evidence that 
mandatory IFRS adoption affects the sensitivity of credit default swaps to accounting earnings. 
Our research focus differs because credit relevance captures the extent to which financial 
statement numbers explain credit ratings. In contrast, changes in the estimated sensitivity (slope 
coefficients) in a credit rating (or credit default swap rate) model do not necessarily imply 
changes in credit relevance.
3
  For this reason, we are agnostic about the magnitude and changes 
of values of slope coefficients and focus on the ability of accounting numbers to explain 
variation in credit ratings.
4
  
Overall, our analysis points to credit rating analysts displaying a degree of accounting 
sophistication in their decision making (Standard & Poor’s 2008, Moody’s 2010, Kraft 2015). 
                                                 
2
 For studies of the implications of IFRS adoption for financing decisions and debt security valuation, see e.g. Florou 
and Kosi (2015) and Naranjo et al. (2015); for studies of the consequences of IFRS adoption for debt contracting see 
Chen et al. (2013), Ball et al. (2015) and Brown (2016). 
3
 Slope coefficients are a function of the underlying measurement scales of variables as well as the degree to which 
economic attributes are captured by accounting numbers. For example, if IFRS numbers are a constant multiple of 
domestic standards numbers, slope coefficients will change by a factor proportional to that multiple. But this does 
not imply that explanatory power (credit relevance) changes.  
4
 Similar to Bhat et al. (2014), in a recent working paper Kraft and Landsman (2014) examine the effects of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting-based prediction models for CDS spreads.   
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Our paper suggests that credit rating analysts understand how accounting measurement rules 
differ across accounting standards regimes and that they do not mechanistically use accounting 
numbers in determining credit ratings. Based on the assumption that ratings depend on 
assessment of the economic fundamentals of firms, the evidence we report is consistent with 
financial statement numbers prepared under IFRS better capturing the economic fundamentals 
that matter for credit ratings. In view of the importance of credit ratings in the market pricing of 
debt, our results complement prior results on the decision relevance of IFRS accounting numbers 
for equity markets obtained by Barth et al. (2008, 2012).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief 
overview of related literature. Section 3 elaborates on our research design. Section 4 outlines the 
sample construction and describes the data. In Section 5 we present our empirical findings. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background and motivation 
2.1. IFRS and credit relevance 
Several prior studies document differences between IFRS and domestic accounting standards in 
respect of both measurement and recognition rules, and in disclosure requirements (e.g. Ding et 
al. 2007, Bae et al. 2008). IFRS are predicted to improve financial reporting because of more 
extensive and informative disclosures, better measurement and recognition rules and enhanced 
comparability (Hail et al. 2010). The potential benefits from IFRS due to enhanced disclosures 
may be less important to solicited rating analysts because they can mitigate weak public 
disclosure through access to private information provided directly by issuers (Jorion et al. 2005, 
Frost 2007, De Franco et al. 2009). Because rating analysts have private access to issuers, we 
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expect that credit relevance effects of IFRS will derive primarily from improved recognition and 
measurement and improved accounting comparability.   
 Credit ratings are designed to inform debt market participants interested in assessing the 
ability of borrowers to service future debt obligations. Hence the economic fundamentals of 
importance to creditors include the future cash flow prospects of a borrower relative to its debt 
obligations, the risk of a borrower defaulting on its debt obligations and the values of a 
borrower’s assets that could be liquidated to meet debt obligations if future cash flows are 
insufficient to meet debt obligations. Asset values are also important when debt contracts include 
collateral provisions (Armstrong et al. 2010). Therefore, financial statements will be useful to 
creditors and credit rating analysts if they contain information that is useful in the prediction of 
future cash flows or if they provide reliable estimates of asset and liability values (Watts 2003).  
 Financial statements prepared under IFRS seek to achieve two important qualitative 
characteristics affecting the usefulness of accounting numbers to creditors: decision relevance (in 
forecasting future cash flows and net asset values) and representational faithfulness 
(International Accounting Standards Board 2015). Fair value accounting methods are an 
important feature of IFRS that is often motivated by reference to these two characteristics. Fair 
value accounting is required in accounting for many categories of financial instruments under 
IFRS 9, and available as an option for other categories of assets and liabilities, including 
property plant and equipment under IAS 16 and investment property under IAS 39. On the one 
hand, fair value accounting results in more timely recognition of economic gains and losses in 
financial statements, resulting in more relevant balance sheet values; on the other hand, it can 
lead to less informative net income measurement because fair value gains and losses are 
transitory in nature, reducing the usefulness of net income in forecasting future cash flows and 
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future debt servicing capacity (Ball et al. 2015). Fair value accounting under IFRS 9 can also 
result in the understatement of the book value of debt relative to its redemption value if a 
borrower’s issued debt is measured at fair value (Schipper 2005, Ball et al. 2008). Fair value 
accounting is also a potential source of concern for creditors because some fair valued balance 
sheet items can be less useful when based on difficult-to-verify inputs requiring management 
judgement and estimates as inputs to valuation models used if liquid market prices are not 
observable (Ball et al. 2015).  
 Accounting rules governing assets carried at amortized historical cost are less likely to be 
relevant because carrying values are generally different from economic values. But impairment 
tests applied under IAS 36 should ensure relatively timely recognition of economic losses and 
ensure alignment of carrying value with economic value when economic values fall below 
historical cost carrying amounts. Such asymmetric re-measurement of asset values is relevant to 
creditors because the values of debt claims are more sensitive to economic losses than to 
economic gains (Ball et al. 2008). But again, relevance may be compromised because 
management judgments and estimates are required in the calculation of recoverable amounts.  
 Harmonised financial reporting under IFRS also aims to produce more comparable 
financial statements.  Potential comparability effects can influence estimated credit relevance in 
an international setting via two main channels. First, when reporting is under domestic 
accounting standards, differences in recognition and measurement rules across countries 
represent a source of country-level idiosyncratic measurement error in accounting numbers 
relative to the fundamental economic attributes assessed by rating analysts. This measurement 
error has a negative effect on estimated credit relevance. When all issuers report under IFRS, 
financial statements should be more comparable across countries, even if they do not capture 
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economic fundamentals perfectly due to measurement and recognition properties of IFRS or 
cross-country differences in reporting incentives and enforcement. Subject to these 
qualifications, country-level recognition and measurement effects attributable to local GAAP are 
eliminated, leading us to expect higher credit relevance under IFRS since accounting numbers 
should map more closely on to the economic fundamentals on average. The second channel 
through which comparability effects might influence credit relevance is linked to the importance 
of peer comparisons in the credit rating process (Standard & Poor’s 2008). Country or industry 
peer comparisons are informative because they contribute to identification of common trends in 
economic fundamentals, and any expansion in the set of comparable issuers potentially generates 
richer information on which to make credit rating assessments. This channel for comparability 
effects suggests that credit ratings could change as a result of enhanced information. 
 Our empirical tests establish whether financial statement numbers produced under IFRS 
explain credit ratings better than accounting numbers produced under domestic standards. Credit 
relevance tests assume that credit ratings reflect analysts’ assessments of the likelihood that 
issuers will default, and if default occurs the expected recovery rate of amounts in arrears. 
Expectations are conditional on analysts’ understanding of the economic position and 
performance of issuers informed by the public disclosures of issuers, including financial 
statements, and private communications between credit rating analysts and issuers. IFRS will be 
more credit relevant than domestic accounting standards if IFRS financial statement numbers 
capture the economic fundamentals determining credit ratings more reliably than numbers 
prepared under domestic standards. 
  Observing increased credit relevance after the adoption of IFRS does not necessarily 
imply that IFRS adoption causes analysts to revise their assessments of economic fundamentals – 
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hence it does not imply that credit ratings change. The reason for this is that IFRS reporting 
could effectively bring into the public domain information that was previously obtained by rating 
analysts through private communications with the borrower (Jorion et al. 2005, Frost 2007, De 
Franco et al. 2009). For example, IFRS reporting enhances transparency relating to pension 
assets, liabilities and deficits in many countries; it is quite likely that prior to IFRS adoption 
rating analysts obtained pensions-related information through communications with the borrower 
when domestic accounting standards did not require such disclosures. However, if IFRS adoption 
does provide new information to rating analysts beyond domestic accounting standards and 
private communications with borrowers, then this would be a further channel positively affecting 
credit relevance as well as, potentially, credit ratings.
5
   
 
2.2. Proximity to default and credit relevance 
Holders of debt securities receive payoffs that are non-linear in the value of firms’ assets. When 
the value of assets is higher than the value of debt obligations, the holders of debt securities 
receive only the cash flows specified in debt contracts. However, when borrowers default, cash 
flows to debt holders are less than specified contractually. Consequently the value of debt is less 
sensitive to positive news than to negative news, leading to debt market demand for accounting 
information being asymmetric (Ball et al. 2008). Consistent with these arguments, prior research 
has found that bond price sensitivity to news about firm fundamentals is greatest when default 
risk is relatively high. For example, Easton et al. (2009) document a larger reaction of bond 
prices to earnings announcements for speculative-grade bonds; De Franco et al. (2009) provide 
evidence of greater reaction of bond market trading volume and returns to bond analysts’ reports 
                                                 
5
 In a 2004 report anticipating the transition to IFRS reporting in Europe Standard & Poor’s stated that they were not 
expecting any widespread or significant rating actions due to IFRS adoption (Standard & Poor’s 2004).   
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for low-rated bonds; and Givoly et al. (2013) find higher explanatory power of an accounting-
based bond returns model for higher yield bonds.  
In our empirical tests we build on these insights by examining whether changes in the 
ability of accounting numbers to explain credit ratings across the pre- and post-IFRS periods 
differs between investment- and speculative-grade firms. If IFRS are more informative and if 
fundamental accounting factors are more important when the proximity to default is higher, 
changes in credit relevance associated with IFRS should be higher for speculative-grade firms.  
 
2.3. Materiality of accounting differences 
IFRS 1 First-Time Adoption of IFRS requires firms to reconcile prior year accounting numbers 
prepared under domestic accounting standards to IFRS when they switch from domestic 
accounting standards to IFRS. We exploit the first-time reconciliations as firm-level measures of 
de facto divergence between domestic accounting standards and IFRS assuming that higher 
divergence will lead to larger firm-specific reconciliations. We make three main predictions 
relating estimated credit relevance and changes in credit relevance to the magnitude of 
reconciliations. First, if IFRS financial statements better capture the economic fundamentals 
underlying credit ratings than domestic accounting standards then estimated credit relevance in 
the pre-IFRS period should be higher for borrowers with relatively small first-time 
reconciliations; second, when first-time reconciliations are relatively large, IFRS-restated 
accounting amounts for the year prior to IFRS adoption should better explain credit ratings in 
that year than accounting amounts prepared under domestic standards; and third, the increase in 
the informativeness of financial statements following the switch to IFRS should be higher for 
firms with larger first-time reconciliations (Brochet et al. 2013, Horton et al. 2013). 
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3. Research design 
3.1. Estimating credit relevance 
We follow Hann et al. (2007) and define credit relevance as the ability of financial statement 
numbers to explain default probabilities, using S&P long-term issuer credit rating as a proxy for 
default risk. Issuer credit ratings are an adequate proxy for default risk for at least three reasons: 
(a) they have been shown to be associated with ex post payment defaults and bond yields (Liu et 
al. 1999, Standard & Poor’s 2008, Jorion et al. 2009); (b) they are determined by rating agencies' 
professional assessments of the probability distribution of future cash flows to debt holders 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006); and (c) in contrast to issue-level credit ratings, they indicate the 
probability of default for the entire firm regardless of the degree of protection afforded to holders 
of specific debt instruments (Cheng and Subramanyam 2008). 
We employ the following empirical model predicting credit ratings as a function of 
contemporaneous financial statement numbers (Blume et al. 1998, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, 
Hann et al. 2007, Jorion et al. 2009):
6
  
Rating = f (IntCov1, IntCov2, IntCov3, IntCov4, ROA, LTD Leverage,  
       TD Leverage, Size, CI, Loss)              (1) 
In line with most prior studies, which collapse multiple ratings into fewer categories (e.g. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Jorion et al. 2009), the dependent variable, Rating, is Standard & 
Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating at the end of fiscal year t, coded as ordered numerical values 
from 1 (CC) to 8 (AAA) so that credit ratings assigned higher numerical scores are assessed as 
                                                 
6
 Consistent with prior studies (Hann et al. 2007; Jorion et al. 2009) we exclude non-accounting variables (e.g. 
equity beta and equity volatility). This choice is justified by our research objective of comparing the credit relevance 
of financial statements prepared under different accounting regimes. However, we assess the robustness of our 
results to the inclusion of market-based factors in Section 5.2. For earlier research on the determinants of credit 
ratings see Horrigan (1966), West (1970) and Kaplan and Urwitz (1979).  
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having higher credit quality. The explanatory variables are based on published financial 
statement numbers and have been found to be important in prior research: interest coverage is 
coded to allow for non-linear effects as proposed by Blume et al. (1998) and Jorion et al. (2009) 
(IntCov1, IntCov2, IntCov3, IntCov4);
7
 profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA); long-
term debt leverage (LTD Leverage) and total debt leverage (TD Leverage); total assets, a proxy 
for firm size (Size); capital intensity (CI); and a loss indicator equal to one if the firm has 
negative earnings in the current and prior fiscal years, and zero otherwise (Loss). Prior research 
finds that credit ratings are positively related to interest coverage, profitability, firm size and 
capital intensity; and negatively related to both measures of leverage and to the loss indicator 
(e.g. Jorion et al. 2009).
 
Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
Since we are interested in predicting discrete ratings probabilities, following prior 
literature (e.g. Blume et al. 1998, Jorion et al. 2009) we estimate equation (1) using ordered 
probit models.
8
 To mitigate the impact of extreme observations all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the extreme percentiles. 
Based on the approach of Hann et al. (2007) and Jorion et al. (2009) we estimate the 
explanatory power of equation (1) with reference to the pseudo-R
2 
statistic, an overall measure of 
goodness of fit equal to one in the case of a perfect fit. We follow Ohlson (1980) and Jorion et al. 
(2009) and employ the McFadden (1974) pseudo-R
2
 statistic.
9
  
                                                 
7
 Blume et al. (1998) argue that although the relation between the latent variable for credit ratings and interest 
coverage is predicted to be positive, the effect should be non-linear. For example, a small change in interest 
coverage when interest coverage is high is expected to have a negligible effect on credit risk. Consequently, Blume 
et al. (1998) and Jorion et al. (2009) capture potential non-linear interest coverage effects by recoding interest 
coverage as four indicator variables, as described in Appendix 1.  
8
 Our findings are robust to the employment of OLS as in Hann et al. (2007).  
9
 Several alternative pseudo-R
2
 measures have been defined for models with categorical response variables. 
However, the McFadden (1974) pseudo-R
2
 is generally accepted as a reasonable measure of goodness of fit 
analogous to the OLS R
2
 statistic, with values close to one (zero) indicating high (low) ability to explain categorical 
outcomes. The McFadden (1974) pseudo-R
2
 is defined as 1- LLM/LLR, where LLM is the log likelihood of the 
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3.2. Comparing credit relevance 
As in prior research, we interpret differences in the model’s explanatory power between two 
accounting regimes (or two time periods) as evidence of differences in credit relevance (Hann et 
al. 2007, Jorion et al. 2009). Specifically, for our primary test of whether the credit relevance of 
accounting numbers changes in the switch to IFRS from domestic accounting standards, we 
compare the pseudo-R
2
 of equation (1) based on a constant sample of mandatory IFRS adopters 
for which credit ratings are available in both the pre-IFRS (2000-2004) and the post-IFRS (2005-
2009) periods. We perform this comparison for the full IFRS sample and separately for IFRS 
firms with investment-grade and speculative-grade credit ratings. If IFRS financial statements 
have higher credit relevance than financial statements prepared under domestic accounting 
standards then we expect an increase in the explanatory power of the credit rating model from 
the pre-IFRS period to the post-IFRS period. In this design each IFRS firm serves as its own 
control, thereby mitigating the potential impact of changes in sample composition over time and 
allowing us to be more confident that observed changes in credit relevance are attributable to the 
switch from domestic accounting standards to IFRS.
10
 We also predict that any increase in the 
model’s explanatory power is more pronounced for speculative-grade issuers with higher default 
risk than for investment-grade issuers.  
To address possible concerns that estimated changes in credit relevance could be driven 
by changes in the economic environment of IFRS adopters unrelated to the financial reporting 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimated model and LLR is the log likelihood of the restricted intercept-only model. See Hu et al. (2006) for further 
discussion. 
10
 We note that if estimated changes in credit relevance are to be attributed to financial reporting changes, the 
methodology mapping economic fundamentals into credit ratings should be relatively stable. Indeed, credit rating 
agencies emphasize the consistency of their rating processes over time and across firms. In line with such claims 
Jorion et al. (2009) find no evidence suggesting that credit standards have tightened over time. The stability of 
ratings processes over time helps mitigate concerns that any observed credit relevance changes subsequent to the 
adoption of IFRS could be attributed to changes in rating practices rather than changes in financial reporting.  
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system, we also employ a matched-sample design where the IFRS sample is matched to a sample 
of US firms that are subject to the same credit rating process but report under US GAAP. 
Similarly to Barth et al. (2012), for each year over the 2000-2009 period we match each 
mandatory adopter to a US firm in the same credit rating category (i.e. investment/speculative), 
same industry sector and year and of similar size, measured by equity market value.
11
 We then 
estimate comparative changes in the credit relevance of financial statement numbers under IFRS 
and US GAAP using a difference-in-differences design. If IFRS provide more informative 
accounting numbers (compared to domestic accounting standards) then we expect any increase in 
credit relevance to be greater for IFRS adopters than for the US control group. In robustness 
checks we demonstrate that results are insensitive to the matched sample design by repeating our 
comparative analysis using the full US population of firms with credit ratings.  
 
3.3. IFRS reconciliations analysis 
We establish a direct link between credit relevance changes and a firm-level measure of the 
impact of IFRS on accounting amounts, exploiting reconciliations of pre-adoption year 
comparative financial statements. For the majority of firms where first-time IFRS financial 
statements are for fiscal year end December 2005, the restated accounting numbers are for fiscal 
year end December 2004; for the remaining firms that adopt IFRS for the first time during 2006, 
reconciliations relate to the fiscal year ending during 2005.  
                                                 
11
 Ideally we would like to match on the same credit rating score rather than the same credit rating category. 
However, this is not possible due to the smaller pool of available US peers. But, we assess the sensitivity of our 
results to alternative matching procedures in Section 5.2. We group firms into 12 aggregate sector groups based on 
Campbell (1996) using the SIC industry classifications (WS07021). Sectors are defined as follows (WS industry 
numbers in parentheses): Petroleum (13 and 29), Consumer Durables (25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57, and 39), Basic 
Industry (10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33, and 8), Food and Tobacco (1, 20, 21, 54, and 2), Construction (15-17, 32, and 
52), Capital Goods (34, 35 and 38), Transportation (40-42, 44, 45, and 47), Utilities (46, 48, and 49), Textiles and 
Trade (22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, and 59), Services (72, 73, 75, 80, 82, 89, 7, 76, 83, and 87), Leisure (27, 58, 70, 78, 79, 
and 91-99) Finance and Real Estate (60-69). 
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We perform two complementary tests using first-time IFRS reconciliations. First, we 
examine the pseudo-R
2
 of equation (1) for sub-samples of mandatory adopters based on the 
degree to which IFRS affects the accounting variables in the credit rating model. Second, we 
focus on the year prior to IFRS adoption and investigate the relative explanatory power of 
equation (1), first using accounting items prepared under domestic standards and then using 
IFRS-restated accounting items; we execute this analysis for sub-sets with different levels of 
reconciliations.   
We collect all firm-level restated accounting items from Worldscope and identify those 
due to first-time IFRS application if the indicator Restatement Reason (WS11559) is coded 4 
(i.e. ‘Accounts are restated due to a change in GAAP followed by the company’) and the 
indicator Accounting Standards Followed (WS07536) is coded 23 (i.e. ‘IFRS’). We estimate 
firm-specific IFRS reconciliations as (accounting item under domestic standards - IFRS restated 
accounting item) for each variable used in equation (1). We winsorize each reconciliation item at 
the extreme percentiles. 
We define extreme reconciliations using the following procedure. For each of the six 
accounting variables in equation (1) we generate a binary indicator equal to one if the 
reconciliation is either in the top or the bottom quartile of the distribution.
12
 We then add the six 
extreme reconciliation indicators and obtain a composite score, labelled Total Extreme 
Reconciliations, with a theoretical range from 0 (i.e. the firm reports no extreme reconciliations 
at all) to 6 (i.e. the firm reports extreme reconciliations for all six accounting variables). We 
classify a firm as having large (small) reconciliations if Total Extreme Reconciliations is greater 
                                                 
12
 Applying different cut-off points to identify extreme firm reconciliations, i.e. top and bottom 15 and 35 percent, 
does not alter our inferences. Similarly, using the absolute value of firm actual reconciliations yields consistent 
results.  
 17 
 
than or equal to 4 (lower than 4).
13
 We assume that large (small) reconciliations indicate higher 
(lower) de facto divergence between domestic accounting standards and IFRS.  
We use the extreme reconciliations proxy to test whether IFRS have higher credit 
relevance as follows. First we test whether firms with small first-time reconciliations have higher 
estimated credit relevance than those with large reconciliations in the pre-IFRS period. Then we 
examine credit relevance in the pre-IFRS adoption year and test whether any increase in credit 
relevance in moving from domestic accounting standards to IFRS-restated numbers is higher for 
the large reconciliations sub-sample. Finally, we test whether any observed improvement in 
credit relevance between the pre- and post-IFRS periods is more pronounced for mandatory 
IFRS adopters with large reconciliations.   
 
4. Sample and descriptive statistics 
4.1. Sample composition 
We compile our data by merging the S&P long-term issuer credit ratings database with 
Worldscope fundamentals data. We merge databases based on company name, the only firm 
identifier provided by S&P, employing a name-matching algorithm supplemented by manual 
checks. The S&P database covers 15,401 unique rated entities over the sample period 2000-2009 
and our matching process yields an initial sample of 3,863 firms with Worldscope data.
14
 
We identify the accounting standards used in each firm-year based on the Worldscope 
reporting standards code (WS07536) as applied by Daske et al. (2013). In defining the 
                                                 
13
 For example, a firm with ROA and SIZE extreme reconciliations obtains a Total Extreme Reconciliations score of 
two; in this case the ROA and the SIZE reconciliation (i.e. the difference between local GAAP and IFRS in ROA and 
SIZE, respectively) are below the 25
th
 or above the 75
th
 percentile of the respective reconciliation distribution.   
14
 Our matched sample accounts for 25 percent of the S&P issuer universe over the period 2000-2009. However, the 
true matched proportion is higher after excluding non-corporate issuers (e.g. states, municipalities, etc.) and non-
listed issuer entities (i.e. private firms or subsidiaries of public firms). Unfortunately, the S&P database does not 
allow us to identify such entities explicitly. 
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mandatory IFRS sample we then exclude: firms without necessary financial statement and credit 
rating data; firms from countries that do not mandate IFRS reporting in the sample period (e.g. 
Canada, Japan, and US) or from countries that did not mandate IFRS for first time in 2005 (e.g. 
Singapore, Israel, and New Zealand); voluntary IFRS adopters; firms that do not switch to IFRS 
(e.g. firms in mandated IFRS countries that do not prepare consolidated financial statements); 
firms that used US GAAP before IFRS adoption; and mandatory adopters without observations 
in both the pre-IFRS and the post-IFRS periods. Applying these criteria we obtain a final sample 
of 202 unique firms with credit ratings and reporting under IFRS from seventeen countries 
yielding a total of 1,664 firm-years.
15
 We summarize the IFRS sample selection process in Table 
1.  
The sample of IFRS firms with credit ratings represents a relatively small proportion of 
the universe of all mandatory IFRS adopters. To provide some insights to the representativeness 
of our sample we compare sample firm characteristics to the Worldscope universe and the subset 
of mandatory IFRS adopters within the Worldscope universe. Un-tabulated results show that our 
sample firms are larger, more leveraged and more profitable than both the Worldscope universe 
and the broader set of mandatory IFRS adopters. These differences are unsurprising given that 
Worldscope (and in turn the subset of firms in countries where IFRS is mandated) includes a 
large number of smaller and younger firms which rely less on public debt financing and are 
therefore less likely to receive an S&P issuer credit rating (Denis and Mihov 2003). We also 
compare financial and credit rating data of US firms in the S&P-Worldscope intersection to those 
                                                 
15
 Our final sample is smaller compared to that of related prior studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Hann et al. 
2007, Jorion et al. 2009). However, these papers focus exclusively on US firms and therefore obtain larger samples 
due to credit rating and financial data being obtained from the same database, i.e. Compustat. Similar to our study 
Wu and Zhang (2014) match data from the Moody's default risk database and Worldscope and obtain an 
international credit rating sample of comparable size to ours (i.e. 1,917 vs. 1,664 firm-year observations).   
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of US rated firms examined in prior studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Jorion et al. 2009). In 
general, un-tabulated results show that there are no marked differences in firm characteristics, 
suggesting that our matching process is unlikely to introduce important biases to the analysis.  
Table 2 presents the sample composition analyzed by credit rating (Panel A), country 
(Panel B) and industry sector (Panel C). As shown in Panel A, S&P long-term issuer credit 
ratings range from AAA to CC with rating BBB+ (CC) having the highest (lowest) proportion of 
total observations (19.89 and 0.12 percent, respectively). Further, the majority of firms (86.66 
percent) are rated investment grade, i.e. BBB- or above. Panel B indicates that UK, Australia and 
France have the highest representation in the sample. We note that the low number of firms in 
several countries (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Italy etc.) can be attributed to the small population of 
these countries provided by the S&P database. Our sample is fairly evenly allocated between the 
pre- and post-IFRS period with 56.43 and 43.67 percent of observations respectively in the pre-
IFRS and the post-IFRS periods. Rating agencies often group firms into four major industry 
sectors; as reported in Panel C, the majority of sample firms are industrials (63.53 percent).  
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used to estimate equation (1). We report 
results separately for the pre-IFRS period and the post-IFRS period. Panel A refers to the sample 
of mandatory IFRS adopters, while Panels B and C relate to the matched US sample and the US 
population, respectively. In the case of mandatory IFRS adopters, there are significant 
differences between the pre-IFRS period and the post-IFRS period for several accounting 
variables. For example, after IFRS adoption firms have, on average, higher interest coverage, 
higher profitability, lower total debt, higher total assets and lower capital intensity. The reported 
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differences are consistent with IFRS having systematic effects on financial statement numbers 
used in the credit relevance model to capture economic fundamentals. We also note that the 
proportions of firms rated with investment (speculative) grade do not change significantly over 
the periods surrounding mandated IFRS adoption. The similarity in the distributions of ratings 
over sub-sample periods provides reassurance that the ratings process is relatively stable and is 
therefore unlikely to be a factor that could lead to differences in estimated credit relevance.
16
 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this section we present our empirical findings. First, we compare the explanatory power of the 
accounting-based credit rating model between the pre-IFRS period and the post-IFRS adoption 
period, using the overall IFRS and matched US samples, as well as the US population. Next, we 
assess the robustness of our primary findings in many ways. Then we examine credit relevance 
changes for sub-samples comprising mandatory IFRS adopters with investment-grade and 
speculative-grade ratings; and with small and large reconciliations at first-time IFRS application. 
 
5.1. Credit relevance before and after mandatory IFRS adoption  
Table 4 reports the difference-in-differences analysis comparing credit relevance between 
mandatory IFRS adopters and US firms before and after the mandatory IFRS adoption date. 
Panels A and B refer to the matched US sample and the US population of firms, respectively. 
The reported pseudo-R
2
 statistics are in line with those documented in prior studies (e.g. Jorion et 
al. 2009). As shown, the pseudo-R
2
 statistic for mandatory IFRS adopters is higher by 2.5 
                                                 
16
 Un-tabulated analysis reveals that there are no significant correlations between the independent variables, with the 
exception of the two leverage factors that, as expected, are highly correlated. Because of this we assess the 
sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of LTD Leverage and find similar results. 
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percentage points in the post-IFRS period compared to the pre-IFRS period (24.5 percent and 
22.0 percent, respectively). This finding suggests that IFRS accounting numbers are more 
capable than accounting numbers prepared under domestic accounting standards of capturing the 
economic fundamentals explaining default probabilities, as reflected in analysts’ credit ratings.   
Table 4 Panel A shows that the pseudo-R
2
 measure is higher by 0.9 percentage points for 
the US counterparts over the pre- to post-IFRS period, albeit this increase is smaller than that for 
the IFRS firms. After controlling for time trends in credit relevance captured in the US 
benchmark sample, we observe an increase of 1.6 percentage points in estimated credit relevance 
between the two groups of firms following mandatory IFRS adoption.
17
 Empirical findings in 
Panel B are broadly consistent with those in Panel A; for example, while credit relevance for the 
population of US firms increases slightly between the pre-IFRS period and the post-IFRS period 
by 0.2 percentage points, this increase is lower than that reported for the IFRS sample. 
Collectively, these findings enhance our confidence that the observed improvement in credit 
relevance for the IFRS sample is likely attributed to the transition to the IFRS financial reporting 
regime. 
As mentioned earlier, we are agnostic about the magnitude and change in values of the 
slope coefficients of the accounting-based factors. However, we present the estimation results of 
equation (1) in Appendix II. In general, the accounting variables have the expected signs; that is, 
                                                 
17
 To the best of our knowledge there is no parametric test of statistical significance for differences in goodness of fit 
statistics from models estimated on different samples. The absence of such tests in prior literature (Jorion et al. 
2009) is consistent with this claim. It is possible to apply bootstrap techniques where the treatment effect is 
randomly assigned to produce simulated distributions of goodness of fit statistics. However, in this case as shown by 
Barth et al. (2012) it is important to control for country and industry fixed effects when using an international 
sample. Failure to do so would confound the simulated distribution of goodness of fit statistics with country and 
industry effects. As mentioned in footnote 6 our aim is to compare the relevance of accounting information in 
explaining credit ratings under two alternative financial reporting regimes; therefore, we focus our analysis on the 
model specification that excludes fixed effects and contains accounting variables only. We are able to test for 
statistical significance controlling for country and industry fixed effects as described in Section 5.2.     
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larger firms as well as firms with higher interest coverage, profitability and capital intensity and 
lower long-term leverage receive higher credit ratings. Also, we find that in the post-IFRS period 
the estimates of interest coverage (i.e. IntCov2 and IntCov3) as well as Size become more 
positive and the estimate of Loss becomes more negative. These findings, although not directly 
comparable to prior work due to different research designs, are broadly consistent with the 
results of Wu and Zhang (2014); they document a significant post-adoption increase in the 
sensitivity of credit ratings to accounting numbers for mandatory IFRS adopters, but only in 
countries with strong rules of law (see their Table 5, columns 3 and 4). To examine further the 
impact of the legal environment we replicate our analysis reported in Table 4 after splitting the 
IFRS sample into two groups of countries conditioning on financial reporting enforcement based 
on the Brown et al. (2014) index.
18
 Consistent with Wu and Zhang (2014) un-tabulated analysis 
reports that the increase in the pseudo-R
2
 of the credit rating model from the pre-IFRS period to 
the post-IFRS period is evident primarily for IFRS adopters in countries where financial 
reporting compliance is higher. Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with IFRS financial 
statements being more successful than domestic accounting standards in capturing the economic 
fundamentals underpinning credit ratings.  
 
5.2. Robustness of basic test results 
We perform a number of additional tests to assess the robustness of the findings reported in 
Table 4. We tabulate selected analyses in Table 5. Note that we estimate sensitivity tests using as 
                                                 
18
 To focus explicitly on factors that affect how compliance with accounting standards was promoted around the 
time of IFRS adoption we use the index of financial reporting enforcement constructed by Brown et al. (2014). This 
index measures the degree of accounting enforcement activity by independent enforcement bodies and is constructed 
based on publicly available data provided by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the World Bank 
and the national securities regulators. In our analysis we partition the IFRS sample using the country-level median 
value of the ENFORCE index for years 2002 or 2005 or 2008; the country-level median value of the average 
ENFORCE index for years 2002, 2005 and 2008; and the median value of the ENFORCE index based on all 1,664 
observations. 
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benchmark both the US matched sample and US population, wherever applicable; inferences 
remain qualitatively unchanged across the two alternative control groups, but for brevity we 
tabulate findings only for the US matched sample.
19
  
First, we employ a series of different IFRS sample definitions, as follows: (a) we focus 
only on IFRS adopting countries with relatively large numbers of observations (i.e. UK, 
Australia and France) to ensure that results are not driven by small countries; (b) we extend our 
sample to all mandatory IFRS adopters without requiring them to have credit rating and financial 
statement data in both the pre- and post-IFRS periods to address concerns of potential 
survivorship bias in our sample; (c) we exclude UK firms to ensure our findings are not 
attributed to the largest country in the sample; (d) we eliminate financial firms because of the 
specific structure of their financial statements and distinct reporting requirements; (e) we drop 
countries where voluntary adoption of IFRS was permitted prior to 2005 (i.e. Denmark, Finland, 
Germany and South Africa) to address potential selection bias concerns; and (f) we exclude 
countries that introduced a change from reactive review of financial statements to proactive 
review at the same time as mandatory IFRS adoption, to mitigate concerns that the reported 
increase in credit relevance results from enforcement reforms (Christensen et al. 2013).
20
 In all 
these tests the observed increased credit relevance persists.  
Second, we employ the populations of Canadian and Japanese firms as alternative 
benchmark samples (see Panel A).
21
 Similarly, we adopt alternative matching procedures by 
                                                 
19
 Empirical findings for all sensitivity tests are available from the authors on request. 
20
 These countries include Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and UK. However, we acknowledge that credit 
ratings are relatively sticky and therefore provide a potentially less appropriate setting for testing the Christensen et 
al. (2013) hypothesis. Accordingly, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the observed credit relevance 
effects are the joint outcome of mandatory IFRS adoption and contemporaneous regulatory changes. 
21
 It is not feasible to follow a matched-sample process as in the case of US; such an analysis would reduce the IFRS 
sample due to the lower number of total observations of the Canadian and Japanese population with all the required 
financial and credit rating data (i.e. 803 and 1,618 firm-years, respectively). 
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matching each IFRS firm-year with a US peer in the same year having similar predicted credit 
rating probability and size; and by matching each IFRS observation with a random US 
observation in the same industry and year.
22
 In all cases, empirical findings are qualitatively 
identical to those reported in Table 4.  
Third, in line with prior literature we estimate alternative versions of the credit rating 
model, including: (a) Operating Margin and Return on Equity (ROE) as alternative profitability 
measures (Jorion et al. 2009); (b) Current Ratio and Operating Cash Flow Ratio as additional 
explanatory variables capturing liquidity effects (Jorion et al. 2009); (c) interest coverage ratio 
(IntCov) as a linear term in place of the four interest coverage indicators (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006, Cheng and Subramanyam 2008, Wu and Zhang 2014); and d) market-based factors, 
namely Equity Beta, Residual Volatility and Returns Variability in addition to the accounting-
based variables (Jorion et al. 2009) (see Panel B).
23
 Again, results remain qualitatively 
unchanged.  
Fourth, similar to Barth et al. (2012) we repeat our empirical analysis after including 
country and industry fixed effects to control for any systematic differences in credit ratings 
across countries and industries that could affect credit relevance comparisons. As expected, the 
inclusion of these fixed effects increases the statistical performance of the credit rating model 
and estimated pseudo-R
2
 statistics are higher than those reported in Table 4 in both the pre- and 
post-IFRS periods. In this specification the credit relevance for the IFRS sample increases by 7.9 
                                                 
22
 In the first approach we estimate predicted credit rating probabilities based on our model described in equation (1) 
and after including industry dummies whereas in the second approach we select a random sample of US counterparts 
irrespective of their size and calculate the average difference in pseudo-R
2
 over the pre- to post-IFRS period based 
on 100 random samples.   
23
 Equity Beta is estimated from the market model using daily stock returns in each calendar year. The beta estimates 
are controlled for nonsynchronous trading effects using the Dimson (1979) procedure with one leading and lagging 
value of the market return (market return is based on MSCI World Index). Residual Volatility is the standard error of 
the market model. Returns Variability is computed as the annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Data is 
obtained from Datastream.  
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percentage points after the adoption while the equivalent change for the matched US sample is 
0.2 percentage points.
24
 
Fifth, we assess the robustness of our inferences to using two alternative goodness of fit 
measures for credit relevance, namely the McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) pseudo-R
2
 and the 
Rank Probability Score (see Panels C and D, respectively).
25
 Using these alternative criteria, base 
line inferences remain unchanged. For example, the overall prediction accuracy of the credit 
rating model based on the Rank Probability Score increases by 2.7 percentage points for 
mandatory IFRS adopters following the adoption but only by 0.5 percentage points for the US 
matched firms over the same period.  
Sixth, we restrict our sample period to 2000-2007 to control for the potential effects of 
the global financial crisis (see Panel E). Then we employ an ordered probit model after equally 
weighting each firm in estimation (i.e. using firm averages for the pre- and post-IFRS periods 
instead of weighting each firm by the number of firm-years in a sub-sample); after averaging 
accounting variables over a 2-year and 3-year period (Jorion et al. 2009); and after measuring 
credit ratings three months following fiscal year-end (see Panel F). In all these tests we find 
results consistent with our main findings in Table 4. 
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 As discussed earlier in footnote 17, the inclusion of fixed effects allows us to assess the statistical significance of 
the difference in the pseudo-R
2
 statistic between the IFRS and US samples in the post-IFRS period using bootstrap 
techniques. Specifically, following Barth et al. (2012) we randomize between treated and benchmark US firms 
around IFRS adoption to obtain bootstrap treatment and control samples and then calculate a difference in the 
pseudo-R
2 
statistics
 
across the two samples. Repeating the above procedure 1,000 times, we obtain the empirical 
distribution of the difference in pseudo-R
2 
statistics. Results indicate that this difference is statistically significant (p-
value=0.029).   
25
 Compared to the McFadden pseudo-R
2
 the McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) pseudo-R
2
 has the disadvantage that it 
does not indicate the level of improvement in goodness of fit of the full model relative to the ‘naive’ intercept-only 
model. The Rank Probability Score (RPS) measures the accuracy of probability estimates when the response 
variable has more than two categories. In general, prediction accuracy increases as the model fit improves (BarNiv 
and McDonald 1999). The RPS score is zero for a perfect forecast and positive otherwise; lower values, therefore, 
imply higher prediction accuracy. We multiply differences in RPS by -1 for easier interpretation of results. 
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Finally, we perform a series of ‘placebo tests’ by shifting the IFRS adoption date two 
years backwards (i.e. to 2003); by randomly assigning each firm-year to the pre- and post-IFRS 
periods; and by randomly shifting IFRS adoption one, two or three years backwards for each 
firm. In all these tests the explanatory power of the credit rating model for mandatory adopters 
does not increase between the pre-placebo date and the post-placebo date periods; instead it 
either remains unchanged or decreases slightly.  
Overall, our inferences concerning the incremental credit relevance of IFRS financial 
statement numbers appear insensitive to a wide range of research design choices.  
 
5.3. Changes in credit relevance of IFRS: investment-grade versus speculative-grade firms 
We now continue our analysis by examining changes in credit relevance for investment-grade 
and speculative-grade mandatory IFRS adopters separately. Table 6 reports the findings. As 
shown, for both investment-rated and speculative-rated issuers accounting numbers prepared 
under IFRS are more successful in capturing the economic fundamentals underpinning credit 
ratings than those prepared under domestic accounting standards. However, consistent with 
predictions the increase in credit relevance is more than twice as high for the speculative-grade 
sub-sample (10.0 percentage points) compared to the investment-grade sub-sample (4.9 
percentage points).  
Un-tabulated analysis comparing investment-grade and speculative-grade firms across the 
IFRS and US GAAP samples reveals a larger increase in credit relevance in the post-IFRS period 
for both IFRS sub-sets relative to their respective US GAAP peers. Also, empirical findings 
remain qualitatively unchanged when we repeat the analysis after constraining slope coefficient 
estimates in the ordered probit models to be equal across models for investment-grade and 
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speculative-grade IFRS issuers. This ensures that changes in estimated credit relevance are not 
driven by differences in model calibration arising from estimation in different sub-samples 
partitioned on the dependent variable. In this case, the explanatory power of the credit-relevant 
accounting items increases for both groups of IFRS firms in the post-IFRS period, but the 
increase is much higher for those with a speculative credit rating; the difference between the two 
estimates is 20.7 percentage points.    
In sum, our empirical findings suggest stronger links between credit ratings and IFRS 
accounting numbers for speculative-grade firms. This finding is consistent with prior studies 
indicating stronger association between bond values and accounting information (e.g. De Franco 
et al. 2009, Givoly et al. 2013) for lower credit quality issuers. Overall our results suggest that 
the documented increase in credit relevance after IFRS adoption is more likely associated with 
IFRS per se than with other omitted correlated factors.   
 
5.4. Changes in credit relevance of IFRS: small versus large reconciliations 
Next, we discuss sub-sample analysis based on the magnitude of the first-time IFRS adoption 
reconciliations. Table 7 reports the results of this analysis. Panels A and B provide descriptive 
statistics while Panels C, D and E document the regression analysis findings. Panel A presents 
the distribution of Total Extreme Reconciliations. We classify 44.06 percent (55.94 percent) of 
the IFRS sample as reporting large (small) overall IFRS impact on credit relevant accounting 
numbers. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the absolute values of accounting item 
reconciliations across the small and large reconciliation sub-samples. Our classification shows 
that the economic significance of restatements of accounting variables as a result of switching to 
IFRS can be quite high. For example, for the small reconciliation group, the mean (median) 
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absolute value of the change in interest coverage is 1.35 (0.495) times, while for the large 
reconciliation group the change is 1.967 (1.124) times. Un-tabulated analysis shows that our 
composite extreme reconciliations measure captures firm-level information beyond country or 
industry effects. For example, 34 percent (66 percent) of the UK sample is classified as having 
small (large) reconciliations; while 55 percent (45 percent) of utilities firms are assigned to the 
small (large) reconciliation sub-sample.  
In Panel C we repeat the credit relevance analysis based on equation (1) after partitioning 
firms into small and large reconciliation sub-samples in both the pre- and post-IFRS periods. 
Prior to the implementation of IFRS the pseudo-R
2
 statistic of
 
the credit rating model
 
is much 
higher for IFRS adopters with small reconciliations; the difference in estimated credit relevance 
between the small and large reconciliation sub-sets is 12.8 percentage points. This result suggests 
that credit rating analysts understand the deficiencies of domestic accounting standards in 
capturing economic fundamentals relevant to credit ratings decisions. It also suggests that they 
are able to anticipate some of the potential effects of IFRS on financial reporting. We also see 
from Panel C that the overall increase in credit relevance for IFRS adopters depends on the 
magnitude of first-time reconciliations, and hence on the impact of IFRS on credit relevant 
accounting numbers; the increase in the pseudo-R
2
 of the credit rating model from the pre-IFRS 
period to the post-IFRS period is evident only for IFRS adopters with large reconciliations, the 
magnitude of the increase being 4.9 percentage points. This finding is similar in spirit to results 
in Horton et al. (2013), who find a higher increase in the accuracy of equity analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for mandatory IFRS adopters with larger reconciliations. 
Panel D reports the comparative credit relevance of domestic standards relative to IFRS-
restated accounting amounts for the year prior to IFRS adoption. Again, the credit relevance of 
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the IFRS-restated accounting numbers depends strongly on the magnitude of the reconciliations; 
the pseudo-R
2
 of the IFRS-based credit rating model is higher than that of the local GAAP-based 
model but only for mandatory IFRS adopters with large reconciliations (credit relevance 
increases by 5.6 percentage points). In Panel E we repeat the above analysis for each 
reconciliation item separately, and we summarise the differences in the pseudo-R
2
 statistics 
between the IFRS-based and the domestic accounting standards-based models for small and large 
reconciliations. As shown, in all cases (with the exception of LTD Leverage) the credit relevance 
of the IFRS-restated accounting numbers is higher than that of the equivalent local GAAP 
numbers, but only for issuers with large reconciliations. Consistent with Panel C, these finding 
suggests that credit rating analysts understand the differences between domestic accounting 
standards and IFRS and that IFRS numbers better reflect economic fundamentals.   
Overall, empirical findings in Table 7 support our expectation that the positive impact of 
the mandatory transition to IFRS on the credit relevance of accounting numbers is associated 
primarily with firms where there is higher de facto divergence between reporting under domestic 
accounting standards and under IFRS. Consequently, these findings help mitigate concerns that 
the observed changes in credit relevance are driven by other concurrent changes excluded from 
the analysis.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study we examine changes in the credit relevance of accounting information at the time of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. We define credit relevance as the extent to which accounting numbers 
are associated with default probabilities. We employ S&P issuer credit ratings as a surrogate for 
default risk and estimate the relation between credit ratings and financial statement numbers 
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reported by mandatory IFRS issuers under domestic accounting standards in the pre-IFRS period 
and under IFRS in the post-IFRS period. Our credit relevance metric is based on the explanatory 
power of the model, as captured by the pseudo-R
2 
statistic. 
 Using a constant sample of mandatory IFRS adopters from seventeen countries over the 
period 2000-2009, we document a number of findings that are new to the literature. First, we 
document an increase in the explanatory power of the credit rating model after IFRS adoption for 
the full sample of mandatory adopters. Second, the observed credit relevance improvement is 
greater than that reported for a matched sample of US firms over the same period. We interpret 
our empirical findings as indicating that IFRS provide more reliable and informative financial 
statements to creditors than financial statements prepared under domestic accounting standards.  
In subsequent tests we demonstrate that improvements in the credit relevance of IFRS 
financial statements are more pronounced in specific sub-samples for which stronger effects are 
predicted; namely, for mandatory IFRS adopters with speculative credit ratings rather than 
investment credit ratings, where the demand for accounting information is expected to be higher; 
and for IFRS adopters with large first-time reconciliations, where the impact of IFRS on credit-
relevant accounting numbers is greater. These findings improve confidence that the changes in 
credit relevance we observe for the full sample are related to the financial reporting changes 
resulting from the switch from domestic accounting standards to IFRS, rather than to other un-
modelled factors. 
Two findings in particular point to credit rating analysts being effective in processing 
financial statement information and understanding differences between accounting standards 
regimes. First, prior to IFRS adoption the ability of accounting numbers to determine credit 
ratings is higher for IFRS issuers who subsequently report small first-time reconciliations. 
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Second, IFRS restatements of accounting numbers relating to the pre-IFRS adoption year have 
higher explanatory power for contemporaneous credit ratings than the equivalent accounting 
numbers reported under domestic accounting standards, but only for IFRS adopters reporting 
large first-time reconciliations, even though they are not known at the time.  
Our results are subject to at least two caveats. First, they are based on a selected sample 
of firms that are rated by one of the major rating agencies. Results might not generalize to other 
rating agencies; or to firms that do not have credit ratings. Second, we assume that credit ratings 
capture fundamental differences in default risk across firms. To the extent that credit ratings are 
incomplete measures of default risk, our results could understate the credit relevance of IFRS 
financial statements. Nevertheless, subject to these caveats, our study documents that mandatory 
IFRS adoption is associated with improved informativeness of financial statements from the 
perspective of creditors.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Variable definitions 
 
Rating Rating score assigned to Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating at the end 
of fiscal year, converted into numerical values from 1 (CC) to 8 (AAA) 
InvGrade Binary variable that equals 1 if a firm’s credit rating is investment grade (i.e. BBB- 
or higher), and 0 if rating is speculative grade 
IntCov Interest coverage ratio measured as operating income before depreciation 
(WS18155) minus depreciation (WS01151) deflated by interest expense 
(WS01251). The variable is treated in a non-linear fashion. After setting IntCov to 
0 for negative values and to 100 for values above 100, four variables are 
constructed as described below 
IntCov1 Variable equals IntCov if 0 ≤ IntCov < 5, and 5 otherwise 
IntCov2 Variable equals 0 if IntCov< 5, equals (IntCov-5) if 5 ≤ IntCov< 10, and 5 otherwise 
IntCov3 Variable equals 0 if IntCov< 10, equals (IntCov-10) if 10 ≤ IntCov< 20, and 10 
otherwise 
IntCov4 Variable equals 0 if IntCov< 20, and (IntCov-20) otherwise 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items (WS01551) deflated by total assets 
(WS02999) 
LTD Leverage Long-term debt leverage measured as a ratio of long-term debt (WS03251) to total 
assets (WS02999) 
TD Leverage Total debt leverage measured as a ratio of total debt (WS03255) to total assets 
(WS02999) 
Size Natural log of total assets in USD (WS07230) 
CI Capital intensity measured as a ratio of net property, plant and equipment 
(WS02501) to total assets (WS02999)  
Loss Binary variable that equals 1 if net income before extraordinary items (WS01551) is 
negative in the current and prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Operating Margin Operating income before depreciation (WS18155) deflated by sales (WS01001) 
ROE Net income before extraordinary items (WS01551) deflated by book value of equity 
(WS03501) 
Current Ratio Current assets (WS02201) deflated by current liabilities (WS03101) 
Operating Cash Flow Net income bottom-line (WS01651) plus depreciation (WS01151) minus change in 
current assets (WS02201) plus change in current liabilities (WS03101) deflated 
by total debt (WS03255) 
Market Capitalisation 
Equity Beta  
 
 
 
Residual Volatility 
Returns Variability 
 
Market value in USD (WS07210) 
Estimated from the market model using daily stock returns in each calendar year. 
The beta estimates are controlled for nonsynchronous trading effects using the 
Dimson (1979) procedure with one leading and lagging value of the market return 
(market return is based on MSCI World Index)  
The standard error of residuals from the market model   
Annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns   
 
 
This table provides details on the definition of all variables. Worldscope item codes are in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Estimation results of the credit rating model 
Independent Variables Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS 
IntCov1 0.085*  
(0.074) 
0.055  
(0.390) 
IntCov2 0.098**  
(0.036) 
0.116***  
(0.009) 
IntCov3 -0.039  
(0.210) 
0.064**  
(0.017) 
IntCov4 0.017***  
(0.004) 
0.009  
(0.123) 
ROA 3.085***  
(0.003) 
0.257  
(0.782) 
LTD Leverage -3.063*** 
 (0.002) 
-1.614*  
(0.094) 
TD Leverage 1.660**  
(0.049) 
1.667  
(0.100) 
Size 0.499***  
(0.000) 
0.603***  
(0.000) 
CI 0.862***  
(0.004) 
0.707**  
(0.023) 
Loss -0.721***  
(0.001) 
-1.007***  
(0.002) 
No. of observations 939 725 
Pseudo-R
2
 (McFadden) 0.220 0.245 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates of the following model: 
 
Rating = f (IntCov1, IntCov2, IntCov3, IntCov4, ROA, LTD Leverage, TD Leverage, Size, CI, Loss) 
 
Total sample contains 1,664 firm-years for 202 unique mandatory IFRS adopters with observations in 
both the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period during 2000-2009. Models are estimated using the ordered 
probit regression, where Rating is an ordered dependent variable on a scale from 1 to 8. Other variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix 1.  
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. In parentheses we report p-values 
based on firm clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 1 
Sample formation 
 
  Firms Firm-years 
S&P database (2000 - 2009) 15,401 - 
WS database (2000 - 2009) 45,440 - 
Matched firms 3,863 - 
   Less firms with missing financial data (311) - 
Matched firms with required financial data 3,552 26,869 
   Less firms from countries that do not mandate IFRS (either at all or    
   in 2005) (2,897) (22,146) 
Matched firms with required financial data and from countries that 
mandate IFRS in 2005 655 4,723 
   Less firms/observations with missing credit rating data (23) (1,095) 
Matched firms with required financial and credit rating data and from 
countries that mandate IFRS in 2005 632 3,628 
   Less voluntary IFRS adopters  (160) (935) 
   Less firms not switching to IFRS (119) (550) 
   Less firms using US GAAP     (21) (107) 
Mandatory IFRS adopters 332 2,036 
   Less mandatory IFRS adopters without observations in both periods (130) (372) 
Final IFRS sample 202 1,664 
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TABLE 2 
Sample composition  
 
               Panel A: By credit rating 
S&P Issuer Credit 
Rating Firm-years % Rating InvGrade 
AAA 9 0.54 8 Investment 
AA+ 20 1.20 7 Investment 
AA 34 2.04 7 Investment 
AA- 107 6.43 7 Investment 
A+ 134 8.05 6 Investment 
A 162 9.74 6 Investment 
A- 257 15.44 6 Investment 
BBB+ 331 19.89 5 Investment 
BBB 251 15.08 5 Investment 
BBB- 137 8.23 5 Investment 
BB+ 69 4.15 4 Speculative 
BB 48 2.88 4 Speculative 
BB- 47 2.82 4 Speculative 
B+ 20 1.20 3 Speculative 
B 8 0.48 3 Speculative 
B- 16 0.96 3 Speculative 
CCC+ 4 0.24 2 Speculative 
CCC 8 0.48 2 Speculative 
CC 2 0.12 1 Speculative 
Total 1,664 100     
 
   Panel B: By country 
        Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS 
Country 
Firm-
years % Firms Firm-years Firm-years 
Australia 338 20.31 40 193 145 
Belgium 13 0.78 2 5 8 
Denmark 10 0.60 1 6 4 
Finland 17 1.02 2 9 8 
France 256 15.38 31 145 111 
Germany 39 2.34 5 19 20 
Ireland 23 1.38 3 12 11 
Italy 4 0.24 1 1 3 
Netherlands 109 6.55 13 68 41 
Norway 29 1.74 4 14 15 
Philippines 26 1.56 4 11 15 
Poland 7 0.42 1 4 3 
Portugal 34 2.04 4 18 16 
South Africa 13 0.78 2 5 8 
Spain 102 6.13 12 58 44 
Sweden 110 6.61 12 65 45 
UK 534 32.09 65 306 228 
Total 1,664 100 202 939 725 
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  Panel C: By industry sector 
        Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS 
Industry Sector 
Firm-
years % Firms Firm-years Firm-years 
Industrials 1,039 63.53 120 608 431 
Transport 88 4.90 11 49 39 
Utilities 350 21.16 42 194 156 
Financials 187 10.41 29 88 99 
Total 1,664 100 202 939 725 
 
Total sample contains 1,664 firm-years for 202 unique mandatory IFRS adopters with 
observations in both the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period during 2000-2009. Panel A shows 
how ratings are grouped into eight categories to generate the dependent variable Rating. We 
also split ratings into investment grade and speculative grade (InvGrade). Panel B reports 
composition of the sample by country and shows number of observations in the pre- and post-
IFRS adoption period. Panel C reports composition of the sample by industry sector and 
reports number of observations in the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: IFRS firms  
  Pre-IFRS (N=939)       Post-IFRS (N=725)       
Diff. in 
mean 
  Mean SD P25 Median P75 Mean SD P25 Median P75 p-value 
IntCov 6.748 13.670 2.603 4.091 6.931 9.575 18.234 3.286 5.122 8.459 0.000 
IntCov1 3.646 1.488 2.603 4.091 5.000 4.067 1.313 3.286 5.000 5.000 - 
IntCov2 1.129 1.799 0.000 0.000 1.931 1.591 2.039 0.000 0.122 3.459 - 
IntCov3 0.640 2.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.176 2.898 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
IntCov4 1.129 8.509 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.288 11.925 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
ROA 0.035 0.064 0.017 0.038 0.063 0.057 0.063 0.026 0.053 0.088 0.000 
LTD Leverage 0.268 0.150 0.164 0.252 0.342 0.262 0.159 0.154 0.229 0.346 0.425 
TD Leverage 0.347 0.157 0.236 0.341 0.433 0.331 0.167 0.211 0.307 0.430 0.038 
Size 15.885 1.384 14.928 15.733 16.745 16.378 1.481 15.414 16.289 17.267 0.000 
CI 0.393 0.259 0.179 0.360 0.600 0.360 0.268 0.130 0.308 0.560 0.010 
Loss 0.068 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Rating 5.420 0.987 5.000 5.000 6.000 5.292 0.922 5.000 5.000 6.000 0.007 
InvGrade 0.880 0.326 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.358 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.074 
 
Panel B: Matched US firms  
  Pre-IFRS (N=939)       Post-IFRS (N=725)       
Diff. in 
mean 
  Mean SD P25 Median P75 Mean SD P25 Median P75 p-value 
IntCov 8.829 9.999 3.486 5.522 9.849 9.801 11.700 3.513 5.860 11.070 0.068 
IntCov1 4.185 1.178 3.486 5.000 5.000 4.157 1.304 3.513 5.000 5.000 - 
IntCov2 1.818 2.137 0.000 0.522 4.849 2.008 2.183 0.000 0.860 5.000 - 
IntCov3 1.477 3.196 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.767 3.441 0.000 0.000 1.070 - 
IntCov4 1.349 5.935 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.870 7.512 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
ROA 0.050 0.051 0.025 0.044 0.074 0.051 0.061 0.026 0.048 0.083 0.493 
LTD Leverage 0.283 0.151 0.180 0.264 0.368 0.286 0.169 0.166 0.264 0.364 0.676 
TD Leverage 0.330 0.156 0.229 0.317 0.416 0.333 0.172 0.210 0.310 0.416 0.744 
Size 15.638 1.331 14.647 15.541 16.624 16.089 1.276 15.132 16.078 17.068 0.000 
CI 0.408 0.254 0.193 0.371 0.603 0.401 0.274 0.166 0.338 0.634 0.620 
Loss 0.045 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.539 
Rating 5.279 0.911 5.000 5.000 6.000 5.206 0.901 5.000 5.000 6.000 0.101 
InvGrade 0.880 0.326 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.358 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.074 
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Panel C: US population   
  Pre-IFRS (N=5,924)       Post-IFRS (N=4,254)       
Diff. in 
mean 
  Mean SD P25 Median P75 Mean SD P25 Median P75 p-value 
IntCov 7.325 11.848 2.279 3.952 7.361 9.075 13.939 2.553 4.699 9.666 0.000 
IntCov1 3.523 1.576 2.279 3.952 5.000 3.721 1.580 2.553 4.699 5.000 - 
IntCov2 1.278 1.968 0.000 0.000 2.361 1.684 2.151 0.000 0.000 4.666 - 
IntCov3 1.072 2.829 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.566 3.293 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
IntCov4 1.674 9.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.426 11.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
ROA 0.021 0.095 0.005 0.032 0.060 0.020 0.115 0.008 0.036 0.070 0.835 
LTD Leverage 0.329 0.209 0.188 0.299 0.431 0.306 0.211 0.157 0.269 0.411 0.000 
TD Leverage 0.380 0.215 0.238 0.350 0.484 0.351 0.221 0.200 0.317 0.461 0.000 
Size 14.924 1.406 13.893 14.752 15.881 15.277 1.447 14.276 15.153 16.225 0.000 
CI 0.380 0.263 0.159 0.329 0.586 0.347 0.271 0.115 0.279 0.557 0.000 
Loss 0.147 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rating 4.569 1.212 4.000 5.000 5.000 4.466 1.182 4.000 5.000 5.000 0.000 
InvGrade 0.536 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.505 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.002 
 
Total sample contains 1,664 firm-years for 202 unique mandatory IFRS adopters with observations in both the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period during 
2000-2009. Panels A, B and C report descriptive statistics for mandatory IFRS adopters, matched and all US firms, respectively, for the pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption period separately and the test of the difference in means. We report exact levels of significance of a two-sided test. For each year over the 2000-
2009 period we match each mandatory adopter to a US firm in the same credit rating category (i.e. investment/speculative), same industry sector and year and 
of similar size, measured by equity market value. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 4 
Credit relevance before and after mandatory IFRS adoption  
 IFRS vs. US 
 
Panel A: IFRS vs. matched US sample 
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS firms (i)                   0.220 
(N=939) 
0.245 
(N=725) 
0.025 
 
US firms    (ii)                      0.240 
(N=939) 
0.249 
(N=725) 
0.009 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.020  -0.004 0.016 
 
Panel B: IFRS vs. US population 
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS firms (i)                   0.220 
(N=939) 
0.245 
(N=725) 
0.025 
 
US firms    (ii)                      0.263 
(N=5,924) 
0.265 
(N=4,254) 
0.002 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.043  -0.020 0.023 
 
This table reports McFadden's pseudo-R
2
 as the credit relevance metric of estimated models. Total sample 
contains 1,664 firm-years for 202 unique mandatory IFRS adopters with observations in both the pre- and post-
IFRS adoption period during 2000-2009. For each year over the 2000-2009 period we match each mandatory 
adopter to a US firm in the same credit rating category (i.e. investment/speculative), same industry sector and 
year and of similar size, measured by equity market value.  
 
All models are estimated using the ordered probit regression, where Rating is an ordered dependent variable on 
a scale from 1 to 8. Other variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. Models are estimated separately for 
the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period and are of the form: 
 
Rating = f (IntCov1, IntCov2, IntCov3, IntCov4, ROA, LTD Leverage, TD Leverage, Size, CI, Loss) 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. All models are estimated with White 
standard errors adjusted to account for correlation within firm clusters.  
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TABLE 5 
Credit relevance before and after mandatory IFRS adoption   
Selected robustness analyses 
 
Panel A: Employ the population of Canadian and Japanese firms as alternative benchmark samples 
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS firms         (i)                   0.220 
(N=939) 
0.245 
(N=725) 
0.025 
 
Canadian firms (ii)                      0.301 
(N=451) 
0.291 
(N=352) 
-0.010 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.081 -0.046 0.035 
Japanese firms (iii) 0.196 
(N=977) 
0.133 
(N=641) 
-0.063 
 
(i)-(iii) 0.024 0.112 0.088 
 
Panel B: Include market-based variables  
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS (i)                   0.266 
(N=893) 
0.299 
(N=621) 
0.033 
 
US matched (ii)                      0.294 
(N=893) 
0.281 
(N=621) 
-0.013 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.028  0.018 0.046 
 
Panel C: Estimate the McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R
2
 
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS firms (i)                   0.500 
(N=939) 
0.529 
(N=725) 
0.029 
 
US firms    (ii)                      0.521 
(N=939) 
0.530 
(N=725) 
0.009 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.021 -0.001 0.020 
 
Panel D: Estimate the Rank Probability Score  
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS firms (i)                   0.353 
(N=939) 
0.326 
(N=725) 
0.027 
 
US firms    (ii)                      0.320 
(N=939) 
0.315 
(N=725) 
0.005 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.033 -0.011 0.022 
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Panel E: Restrict sample period to 2000-2007  
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS firms (i)                   0.220 
(N=939) 
0.256 
(N=505) 
0.036 
 
US firms    (ii)                      0.240 
(N=939) 
0.243 
(N=505) 
0.003 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.020 0.013 0.033 
 
Panel F: Measure credit ratings three months after fiscal year-end 
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
IFRS firms (i)                   0.233 
(N=939) 
0.247 
(N=725) 
0.014 
 
US firms    (ii)                      0.243 
(N=939) 
0.251 
(N=725) 
0.008 
 
(i)-(ii) -0.010 -0.004 0.006 
 
This table presents selected analyses assessing the robustness of findings reported in Table 4. For each year 
over the 2000-2009 period we match each mandatory adopter to a US firm in the same credit rating category 
(i.e. investment/speculative), same industry sector and year and of similar size, measured by equity market 
value.  
 
All models are estimated using the ordered probit regression, where Rating is an ordered dependent variable on 
a scale from 1 to 8. Other variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. Models are estimated separately for 
the pre- and post-IFRS adoption period and are of the form: 
 
Rating = f (IntCov1, IntCov2, IntCov3, IntCov4, ROA, LTD Leverage, TD Leverage, Size, CI, Loss) 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. All models are estimated with White 
standard errors adjusted to account for correlation within firm clusters.  
 
In Panel B we include market-based variables, namely Equity Beta, Residual Volatility and Returns Variability. 
In Panels C and D, we employ two alternative goodness of fit measures of credit relevance, namely the 
McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R
2
and the Rank Probability Score (RPS), respectively. The RPS measures the 
accuracy of probability estimates when the response variable has more than two categories; lower values imply 
higher prediction accuracy. For easier interpretation of results, we multiple differences in RPS by -1. 
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TABLE 6 
Credit relevance before and after mandatory IFRS adoption 
Investment-grade vs. speculative-grade firms 
 
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
Investment-grade  (i)              0.181 
(N=826) 
0.230 
(N=616) 
0.049 
 
Speculative-grade (ii)                     0.208 
(N=113) 
0.308 
(N=109) 
0.100 
 
(ii)-(i) 0.027  0.078 0.051 
 
This table reports McFadden's pseudo-R
2
 as the credit relevance metric of estimated models. Total sample 
contains 1,664 firm-years for 202 unique mandatory IFRS adopters with observations in both the pre- and post-
IFRS adoption period during 2000-2009. Investment grade firms are rated BBB- or above.  
 
All models are estimated using the ordered probit regression, where Rating is an ordered dependent variable on a 
scale from 1 to 8. Other variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. Models are estimated separately for the 
pre- and post-IFRS adoption period and are of the form: 
 
Rating = f (IntCov1, IntCov2, IntCov3, IntCov4, ROA, LTD Leverage, TD Leverage, Size, CI, Loss) 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. All models are estimated with White 
standard errors adjusted to account for correlation within firm clusters.  
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TABLE 7 
Credit relevance at the time of mandatory IFRS adoption   
Small vs. large first-time IFRS reconciliations 
 
Panel A: Total extreme reconciliations  
Range No. observations (%) 
0 16 (7.92) 
1 32 (15.84) 
2 37 (18.32) 
3 28 (13.86) 
4 40 (19.80) 
5 32 (15.84) 
6 17 (8.42) 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
 Small (N=113) Large (N=89) 
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
IntCov 1.350 0.495 2.440 1.967 1.124 2.823 
ROA 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.022 0.011 0.026 
LTD Leverage 0.009 0.004 0.017 0.032 0.023 0.029 
TD Leverage 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.027 0.019 0.028 
Size 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.079 0.068 0.072 
CI 0.011 0.006 0.015 0.030 0.024 0.030 
 
Panel C: Pre-IFRS vs. post-IFRS period 
Sample Pre-IFRS 
(a) 
Post-IFRS 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
Small reconciliations (i) 0.295 
(N=501) 
0.285 
(N=394) 
-0.010 
 
Large reconciliations (ii) 0.167 
(N=438) 
0.216 
(N=331) 
0.049 
 
(ii)-(i) -0.128 -0.069 0.059 
 
Panel D: Local GAAP vs. IFRS-restated accounting factors 
Sample Local GAAP 
(a) 
IFRS-restated 
(b) 
(b)-(a) 
Small reconciliations (i)               0.296 
(N=113) 
0.291 
(N=113) 
-0.005 
 
Large reconciliations (ii)              0.211 
(N=89) 
0.267 
(N=89) 
0.056 
 
(ii)-(i) -0.085 -0.024 0.061 
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Panel E: Local GAAP vs. IFRS-restated accounting factors for each reconciliation  
Variables Small reconciliations (i) Large reconciliations (ii) (ii)-(i) 
IntCov -0.002 0.030 0.032 
ROA -0.001 0.022 0.023 
LTD Leverage 0.018 0.013 -0.005 
TD Leverage -0.004 0.034 0.038 
Size 0.002 0.058 0.056 
CI -0.003 0.038 0.041 
 
Total sample contains 1,664 firm-years for 202 unique mandatory IFRS adopters with observations in both the 
pre- and post-IFRS adoption period during 2000-2009. Firm-level reconciliations are measured as (Local GAAP 
accounting item - IFRS restated accounting item). Panel A describes the distribution of Total Extreme 
Reconciliations, which is a categorical variable equal to the sum of six binary indicators (one for each accounting 
factor used in the credit rating model); each indicator takes the value of 1 if the reconciliation is extreme, i.e. it is 
in the top or bottom 25 percent, and 0 otherwise. Total Extreme Reconciliations may range from 0 (i.e. the firm 
reports no extreme reconciliations at all) to 6 (i.e. the firm reports extreme reconciliations for all six accounting 
variables). We classify a firm as having large (small) reconciliations if Total Extreme Reconciliations is equal to 
or higher than 4 (lower than 4). Panel B reports descriptive statistics of the absolute values of accounting item 
reconciliations for small and large firm-level reconciliation sub-samples. All actual reconciliations are winsorized 
at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
 
Panels C, D and E report McFadden's pseudo-R
2
 as the credit relevance metric of estimated models. In Panel C 
we estimate the credit rating model in the pre- and post-IFRS period separately. In Panel D we focus on the last 
year prior to IFRS adoption and run the credit rating model using local GAAP and IFRS-restated accounting 
variables separately. In Panel E we repeat the analysis reported in Panel D for each reconciliation separately and 
we present the difference in McFadden's pseudo-R
2
 between IFRS-restated and Local GAAP for small (i) and 
large (ii) reconciliations. 
 
All models are estimated using the ordered probit regression, where Rating is an ordered dependent variable on a 
scale from 1 to 8. Other variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. Estimated models are of the form: 
 
Rating = f (IntCov1, IntCov2, IntCov3, IntCov4, ROA, LTD Leverage, TD Leverage, Size, CI, Loss) 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. All models are estimated with White 
standard errors adjusted to account for correlation within firm clusters.  
 
